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THE AQUADVANTAGE SALMON: WHO OWNS
ESCAPED GENETICALLY MODIFIED ANIMALS?
Matthew Morgan*

I. INTRODUCTION
It is likely that the last Atlantic salmon you ate was not caught from
the depths of the Atlantic Ocean. In fact, it is highly probable that the
salmon was never caught at all. The vast majority of Atlantic salmon
sold in the United States is “farm raised” salmon, which are salmon that
never swim freely in any body of water other than a fish pen.1 This
system of fish farming is known as aquaculture. The global production
of salmon, which exceeded one million tons in 2008, is the top
aquaculture money maker.2 Moreover, aquaculture accounts for seventythree percent of global salmon production.3 Aquaculture allows for
greater control of production and also helps deter the overfishing of
Increasingly,
already fragile wild Atlantic salmon populations.4
however, the aquaculture process has been subject to criticisms relating
to the prevalence of disease and sea lice in its products, the frequency of
* Research Editor, Ocean and Coastal Law Journal, University of Maine School of
Law, expected graduation 2012.
1. U.N. FOOD & AGRIC. ORG., FISHERIES AND AQUACULTURE STATISTICS:
AQUACULTURE PRODUCTION 48 (2008), http://www.fao.org/docrep/013/i1890t/i1890t.pdf
[hereinafter FISHERIES AND AQUACULTURE STATISTICS].
2. Id. at 28; CABI INT’L, ENVIRONMENTAL RISK ASSESSMENT OF GENETICALLY
MODIFIED ORGANISMS: VOLUME 3, METHODOLOGIES FOR TRANSGENIC FISH 70 (Anne R.
Kapuscinski et al. eds., 2007).
3. FISHERIES AND AQUACULTURE STATISTICS, supra note 1, at 48 (data as of 2008).
4. Dams, in particular, have devastated salmon populations throughout the United
States to such an extent that the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN)
has placed Atlantic salmon on its “Red List” for threatened animals; the species is extinct
from most New England rivers, and the species was added to the federal Endangered
Species list in 2000 for the few remaining rivers in Maine in which a salmon population
still exists. See INT’L UNION FOR CONSERVATION OF NATURE, SPECIES SURVIVAL COMM.,
SALMON AND CLIMATE CHANGE: FISH IN HOT WATER, IUCN RED LIST OF THREATENED
SPECIES (2009), http://cmsdata.iucn.org/downloads/fact_sheet_red_list_salmon.pdf.
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species escape, and the creation of “dead zones” from highly
concentrated waste.5 Additionally, there is a growing awareness that the
antibiotics used on farmed salmon may not be healthy for human
consumption.6 More significantly, the depleted state of wild fisheries
places increased demand on the production capacities of aquaculture.7 In
order to make salmon aquaculture a more viable and productive business,
scientists have begun creating genetically modified (GM) Atlantic
salmon with various traits.8 With the production of the AquAdvantage
Salmon (AAS), which grows up to four times larger than traditional
Atlantic salmon because of the introduction of growth hormone genes
from other fish, AquaBounty Technologies (AquaBounty) has been at the
forefront of genetic modification in Atlantic salmon.9 AquaBounty
markets the AAS as a panacea for fish farming issues and global protein
shortages.10 The patenting and production of GM salmon, however,
presents a number of potential risks, including food safety, market
dominance over a very important food source, and various property
issues resulting from AAS escaping and cross-breeding with wild
salmon. This last consideration is the focus of this comment.
If AAS escapes and either out-competes the native salmon
populations or mates with them and forever alters their genetic makeup,
then this will result in a showdown of competing legal interests.
Conventional Atlantic salmon fishermen (hereinafter non-GM fishermen)
and public stakeholders in wild Atlantic salmon have certain property
5. See generally Bill Trotter, Pesticide Use, Lobster Deaths Probed in Down East
Waters, BANGOR DAILY NEWS, Jan. 7, 2011, http://new.bangordailynews.com/
2011/01/07/business/pesticide-use-lobster-deaths-probed-in-down-eastwaters/?ref=relatedBox (covering not only harm to lobster populations, but also the wider
Atlantic Ocean environment).
6. Id.
7. See U.N. FOOD & AGRIC. ORG., FISHERIES AND AQUACULTURE: FISH FOR FOOD,
LIVELIHOOD AND TRADE (2009), ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/011/i0765e/i0765e09.pdf (“If
overall production is to keep pace with an expanding world population, and given the
strong likelihood that capture fisheries will remain stagnant, future growth will have to
come from aquaculture.”).
8. CABI INT’L, supra note 2, at 77-79 (mentioning the following possible GM traits:
growth enhancement, disease resistance, cold tolerance, metabolism (i.e., creating fish
capable of consuming plants), sterility, saltwater tolerance, and environmental monitoring
(e.g., fish that change color when levels of certain chemicals are present in the water)).
9. Transgenic Salmonid Fish Expressing Exogenous Salmonid Growth Hormone,
U.S. Patent No. 5,545,808 col.5 ls.12-15 (filed Aug. 13, 1996).
10. AQUABOUNTY TECHNOLOGIES, INC., ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT FOR
AQUADVANTAGE®
SALMON
12
(2010),
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/
AdvisoryCommittees/CommitteesMeetingMaterials/VeterinaryMedicineAdvisoryCommi
ttee/UCM224760.pdf.
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interests based on the public trust doctrine. Biotechnology companies,
such as AquaBounty, arguably have a more discrete and enforceable
property interest based on their patent of AAS. Few parties dispute
AquaBounty’s right to protect and produce its patented fish so long as
the fish remain in AquaBounty’s production sites. But what will happen
if AquaBounty’s fish escape into the wild? No case law definitively
resolves this question. This paper, therefore, relies on an analogy to case
law addressing the capture of wildlife and patent infringement of GM
plants. Because the factual details in these two areas of GM plant law
may differ from those in the GM animals context, the following
hypothetical escape scenario is offered as the factual foundation of a
potential lawsuit against non-GM fishermen for infringement of an AAS
patent:
The AAS has been mass produced at a number of New England
aquaculture sites with great success. One night, however, the
combination of a power outage and a huge storm compromises a
low containment system at an aquaculture site. A number of
AAS escape and populate the surrounding area. Resulting
generations, which may be wild-AAS hybrids or simply second
generation AAS, express the same genes for increased growth
and cold resistance that AquaBounty patented in AAS. After a
couple of years, the AAS fish farm discovers that its revenues
have been decreasing by a small margin and traces this decrease
to greater competition at a local fish market. After sending an
experienced AAS representative to the market, the fish farm
realizes—based on anecdotal evidence from the fishermen and
increased growth characteristics of the fish—that these fish are
likely wild-AAS hybrids. The representative buys some of the
fish and discovers that they contain the patented genes of AAS.
AquaBounty, which has a license with the fish farm to maintain
its intellectual property rights in AAS, sues the fishermen for
infringement. At trial, the fishermen discover that there is no
such thing as an “innocent infringer” and find themselves
responsible for damages to AquaBounty for lost profits.11
Two major issues must be addressed: How can non-GM fishermen
protect their property interests in native salmon given the threat of escape
in a pre-escape market? How should property rights be determined in a
post-escape market?

11. See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006).
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This Comment explores these two questions through the lenses of
wildlife law and patent law. Part II looks to the AAS itself and answers
many of the questions about how it is produced, how it is contained, and
how the current production and containment systems will change
significantly when the focus moves from research and development to
large-scale production for consumption. Part III looks to traditional legal
concepts of property ownership in wild animals and shows how the
traditional concept of capture, when applied to the unique circumstances
of GM animals, leaves more questions than answers about how to
determine possession of AAS. It then explores the public trust doctrine
as an alternative means of protection for non-GM fishermen. Part IV
shows how the existing state of GM patent law favors biotechnology
companies over non-GM farmers and fisherman, whether or not they
intend to infringe the GM organism patent. Finally, Part V concludes
that this uncomfortable relationship between these two traditional
approaches to property law and GM animals requires judicial and
legislative adjustment to provide for equitable treatment of non-GM
fishermen subject to unintentional infringement suits. It also offers three
existing pre-escape remedies to act as preemptive measures against
possible infringement suits and one post-escape response to infringement
suits.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF AAS AND ISSUES OF ESCAPE
A. The AquAdvantage Salmon
The AAS is a genetically modified Atlantic salmon with growth
characteristics not found in wild or traditional farm-raised Atlantic
salmon.12 A chimeric gene is created by combining an Ocean Pout
antifreeze protein (AFP) promoter with Chinook salmon growth hormone
(GH).13 This chimeric gene is then “microinjected into fertilized,
12. ‘808 Patent, col.5 ls.11-12.
13. Id. cols.4-5 ls.67, 1-3. The Chinook GH increases the growth rate of the AAS.
Use of the Ocean Pout AFP promoter allows the AAS to continue growing in cold
temperatures that would hamper or completely stop growth in traditional wild salmon.
See PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, FUTURE FISH? ISSUES IN SCIENCE AND REGULATION OF
TRANSGENIC FISH 8 (2003) (“The ocean pout’s promoter tells the genes linked to it to stay
‘on’ in cold temperatures—a factor critical to the ocean pout’s ability to survive in its
arctic habitat. Unmodified Atlantic salmon normally produce very little growth hormone
in colder temperatures. Placing the salmon’s growth hormone gene under the control of
the ocean pout’s cold tolerance promoter, however, causes the salmon to make growth
hormone year-round and to reach market size in half the normal time.” (citations
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nonactivated Atlantic salmon eggs.”14 The result is a transgenic fish that
allows AquaBounty to manipulate both the phenotypic and genotypic
characteristics of the salmon and pass these traits on to later
generations.15 The changes in growth are astounding. The AquaBounty
patent application claims that “[a]t eight months old, the average increase
of the transgenic fish was 4-fold and the largest transgenic fish was eight
times bigger than the non-transgenic controls.”16
According to
AquaBounty, this is the largest increase in size ever reported for a
transgenic fish and the gene transfer technique described would be
applicable in “many different species of fish.”17 The final hurdle for
AquaBounty and the focus of this paper for purposes of determining the
legal consequences of escape is FDA environmental approval.18
AquaBounty is currently applying for approval of AAS under the
New Animal Drug Application (NADA) of the Federal Food, Drug, and

omitted)). In a recent presentation to the United States Food and Drug Administration
(FDA), AquaBounty claimed that the chimeric gene has passed through ten generations
of AAS in a stable and predictable manner. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., VETERINARY
MEDICINE ADVISORY MEETING COMMITTEE: AQUADVANTAGE SALMON 105 (2010),
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AdvisoryCommittees/CommitteesMeetingMaterials/Veter
inaryMedicineAdvisoryCommittee/UCM230471.pdf.
14. ‘808 Patent, col.5 ls.8-9.
15. AQUABOUNTY TECHNOLOGIES, INC., supra note 10, at 20-21. The genotypic
differences refer to the fact that these new salmon now carry the chimeric gene, while the
phenotypic changes refer to the actual physical expression of genes in the AAS (e.g.,
increased size and earlier changes in coloration). Both of these changes may be
important in resolving legal disputes over ownership, given that they can distinguish
AAS from a group of wild or traditional farm raised salmon. Id. at 9.
16. ‘808 Patent, col.5 ls.13-16.
17. Id. col.5 ls.16-17.
18. The labeling of GM foods and health consequences from consumption of GM
foods are issues beyond the scope of this paper. For further information, see, e.g.,
Jennifer Corbett Dooren, To Label or Not Label Lab-Spawned Salmon, WALL ST. J., Sept.
22, 2010, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703399
404575506340629229692.html, which outlines criticisms of non-labeled genetically
modified salmon. See also U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., BACKGROUND DOCUMENT: PUBLIC
HEARING ON THE LABELING OF FOOD MADE FROM THE AQUADVANTAGE SALMON (2010),
available
at
http://www.fda.gov/Food/LabelingNutrition/FoodLabelingGuidance
RegulatoryInformation/Topic-SpecificLabelingInformation/ucm222608.htm (providing
the most up-to-date discussions being organized by the FDA to address labeling
concerns); Consumer Right to Know Food Labeling Act of 2010, H.R. Res. 6325, 111th
Cong. (2010) (a failed House bill, proposed for the purpose of requiring GM foods to be
specially labeled); PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, supra note 13, at 29-34 (covering
consumption issues ranging from allergens, potential toxic compounds, and elevated
levels of hormones in GM salmon).

132

OCEAN AND COASTAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 17:1

Cosmetic Act (FFDCA).19 Any NADA approval by the FDA, however,
will be conditioned on National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)
approval.20 Regulations promulgated under NEPA focus on the overall
environmental impact of allowing the production of AAS and require
either a categorical exclusion or an environmental assessment (EA) as a
condition for approval.21 AquaBounty’s AAS did not qualify for a
categorical exclusion and AquaBounty was therefore required to submit
an EA to the FDA.22 AquaBounty suggested that the FDA make a
finding of no significant impact (FONSI) on the environment because,
under the specific circumstances presented in their application, the AAS
is “highly unlikely to cause any significant effects on the environment,
inclusive of the global commons, foreign nations not a party to this
action, and stocks of wild Atlantic salmon.”23 The EA and requested
FONSI are both based on strong evidence that AAS escape is unlikely.
However, continued investigation of escape is necessary for two reasons.
First, the model used by AquaBounty in its EA underestimates the
potential harm from escape. Second, the specific circumstances used in
the EA to justify the FONSI are unrealistic when applied to anticipated
wide-scale production in more escape-prone fish farms. This Comment
therefore explores in greater detail the specific findings and reasoning
underlying the EA in order to understand why AAS production and
escape poses a significant danger to non-GM fishermen.

19. 21 U.S.C.A. § 360b(a)(1) (2008) (requiring that any new animal drug must
comply with various portions of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act based on the
purposes of the new drug (human consumption in the case of the AAS)); U.S. FOOD &
DRUG ADMIN., CTR. FOR VETERINARY MEDICINE, BRIEFING PACKET: AQUADVANTAGE
SALMON
ii
(2010),
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AdvisoryCommittees/
CommitteesMeetingMaterials/VeterinaryMedicineAdvisoryCommittee/UCM224762.pdf
[hereinafter FDA BRIEFING PACKET].
20. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (2006).
21. See 21 C.F.R. § 514.1(b)(14) (2010). A categorical exclusion is something that
the FDA has found to “not individually or cumulatively have a significant effect on the
human environment.” See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.4 (2010). An EA, however, is a public
document that requires the FDA to determine whether AquaBounty must prove the safety
of the AAS through a more thorough and rigorous Environmental Impact Statement (EIS)
or whether there is a “finding of no significant impact” (FONSI), which allows
AquaBounty to continue with production under NEPA. See id. § 1508.9.
22. See generally AQUABOUNTY TECHNOLOGIES, INC., supra note 10.
23. Id. at 11.
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B. Escape, Survival, and Impact
The scientific model used in the EA and other investigations of
potential environmental impacts from the escape of GM organisms into
the wild is known as a predictive risk assessment model.24 This model
focuses on three factors: the likelihood of escape, the likelihood of
survival and reproduction after escape, and the impact or “harm” caused
by this surviving GM population on the “receiving” wild population.25
1. Escape
Determining the likelihood of escape is a central feature of the EA
and also of independent studies such as the CABI Report.26 The reason
for this focus is simple: if no fish escape, then there is no need for
concern about gene-flow or harm to native populations. The very
specific nature of AquaBounty’s production site is essential to the
FONSI requested in their EA. Therefore, an important question for the
future is whether companies purchasing AAS for production will follow
the same specific parameters of the current site in spite of their cost and
difficulty to maintain.27 The specific AquaBounty system presented in
the EA is a redundant containment system that takes advantage of three
methods of containment: physical, geographic, and biological.28
Physical containment refers to the actual structures used at the
AquaBounty sites. Conventional aquaculture sites often rely on what are

24. See generally id. at 54; CABI INT’L, supra note 2, at 6.
25. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADEMIES, ANIMAL BIOTECHNOLOGY:
SCIENCE-BASED CONCERNS 75 (2002). The EA produced for the FDA also explores these
same questions. See AQUABOUNTY TECHNOLOGIES, INC., supra note 10, at 54 (“The
potential hazards in this EA center on the likelihood and consequences of AquAdvantage
Salmon escaping, becoming established in the environment, and spreading to other
areas.”).
26. AQUABOUNTY TECHNOLOGIES, INC., supra note 10, at 54; CABI INT’L, supra note
2, at 6.
27. AquaBounty has spent years developing AAS so that it can sell it to farmers who
will then harvest the fish. AquaBounty’s current primary goal, therefore, is merely
approval and sale of the fish. See infra note 60. The goals of fish farmers purchasing
AAS, however, will include more efficient and cost-effective production, which will
almost certainly lead to different production site designs.
28. AQUABOUNTY TECHNOLOGIES, INC., supra note 10, at 59-69; CABI INT’L, supra
note 2, at 209.
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known as “open systems.”29 Open systems, however, are exceptionally
prone to escapes and hence unsuitable for GM salmon.30 AquaBounty’s
proposal, therefore, relies on a closed system with redundant
containment features, such as metal screens, jump fences, and lethal
chemicals in drain areas.31 Closed systems, despite their increased
containment features, are still prone to escape. Containment failures in
closed systems can result from natural disasters (e.g., floods,
earthquakes, or excessive snow), human actions (e.g., either negligence
or intentional release/theft of the valuable AAS), and mechanical errors
(e.g., fish eggs can escape through filtration systems).32 Finally, closed
systems are also far more expensive to operate.33
Geographic containment measures refer to the location of sites in
areas in which the fish should not be able to survive if they manage to
escape from the closed system.34 In the case of AquaBounty’s proposed
site, the eggs are grown on Prince Edward Island, while the actual fish
are raised approximately 2,500 miles away in the Panamanian
highlands.35 AquaBounty’s EA determined that if the eggs were to
escape from the production site on Prince Edward Island, they would be
able to survive during the warmer winter months, but only if they
escaped in later life stages.36 The EA claims that, at the grow-out facility
in Panama, fish would be able to survive in the immediate vicinity of the
facility, but that a combination of warmer water temperatures (higher
than twenty-five degrees Celsius) and hydroelectric plants along the
route to the ocean would stop any seaward migration.37 Geographic
containment mechanisms, like physical containment mechanisms, are
effective, but also very costly. The CABI report notes that the cost of
maintaining sufficiently cold water temperatures in tropical areas would
be “very difficult and costly” for raising salmon and that this cost would
be in addition to the increased “cost of transport to processing facilities
and markets.”38
29. CABI INT’L, supra note 2, at 218 (noting that open systems are cheap because they
are contiguous with natural waterways and require few or none of the filtration systems
necessary in closed systems).
30. Id. at 219-20.
31. AQUABOUNTY TECHNOLOGIES, INC., supra note 10, at 54-55, 63.
32. CABI INT’L, supra note 2, at 214-17.
33. PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, supra note 13, at 16.
34. CABI INT’L, supra note 2, at 220-21.
35. AQUABOUNTY TECHNOLOGIES, INC., supra note 10, at 13.
36. Id. at 69.
37. Id.
38. CABI INT’L, supra note 2, at 220-21.
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Biological containment of AAS stands as the final layer of
redundancy in the AquaBounty containment system.
Biological
containment, like physical containment, refers to a host of potential
mechanisms.39 AquaBounty’s current system has two layers: it attempts
to create an all-female population and to make this all-female population
sterile.40 The all-female egg production system claims a one hundred
percent success rate.41 The system is based on a process that utilizes
gynogenesis.42 This system, however, is only successful if it can be
assured that all escaped fish are stopped from having any contact with
fish of the opposite sex.43 AquaBounty accounts for this shortcoming
with the second process of inducing triploidy in the fish used for
production.44 The triploidy inducement process results in AAS having
three sets of chromosomes in its somatic cells, which reduces the
development of gonads to the point that AAS is effectively sterile.45
However, even AquaBounty acknowledges that the triploidy inducement
process does not have a one hundred percent success rate.46 In addition
to being an imperfect system, triploidy inducement is also an
exceptionally costly system. The CABI report claims that the monitoring
mechanisms needed would be too expensive for all “but the best funded
hatcheries” and that estimated monitoring costs could add between $0.02

39. Id. at 222-23, 231 (mentioning three overarching categories: single sex
populations by various means, induced sterility by various means, and genetic use
restriction technologies (GURTs)).
40. AQUABOUNTY TECHNOLOGIES, INC., supra note 10, at 59.
41. Id. at 40. The EA’s claim of one hundred percent success, however, fails to note
an important caveat about the lack of validation outside AquaBounty’s own selfinterested studies: the briefing packet initially produced by AquaBounty prior to the EA
noted that “[t]he effectiveness of the methods used by AquaBounty to insure that an allfemale population of AquAdvantage Salmon is produced has not specifically been
evaluated quantitatively in any studies to date.” FDA BRIEFING PACKET, supra note 19, at
127.
42. AQUABOUNTY TECHNOLOGIES, INC., supra note 10, at 59; CABI INT’L, supra note
2, at 222 (gynogenesis is achieved by disrupting the process of mitosis through
temperature or pressure shocks, resulting in an activation of the ova without a
contribution from any male genes).
43. CABI INT’L, supra note 2, at 222.
44. AQUABOUNTY TECHNOLOGIES, INC., supra note 10, at 59.
45. Id. See also CABI INT’L, supra note 2, at 225-29 (providing a more detailed
explanation of the process).
46. AQUABOUNTY TECHNOLOGIES, INC., supra note 10, at 60 (claiming a success rate
of 98.9%-100%); see also CABI INT’L, supra note 2, at 229 (“The possibility of fertile
triploids is one of the major shortfalls of triploidy as a biological confinement method for
transgenic fish.”).
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to $0.04 per kilogram of salmon to the market cost.47 Although the
statistical possibility of escape seems small, it is important to keep in
mind the magnitude of potential harm as well as the likelihood that these
statistically small possibilities of escape will increase with the need for
greater production capacity at financially competitive fish farms.
2. Survival
Survival refers to AAS’s ability to coexist with native species after
escape.48 This does not require reproduction, but merely survival
alongside the native population.49 The likelihood of survival is measured
through the concept of fitness.50 AAS’s fitness is determined by
considering the interaction between its unique genotypic and phenotypic
makeup and the wild environment into which it escapes.51 Despite the
slightly different approaches used in the CABI Report and the FDA EA,
one point is emphasized by both reports: it is exceptionally difficult to
predict the consequences of releasing a genetically modified living
organism, which has only ever been examined in controlled settings, into
a wild environment with any number of variables occurring on both
meta- and micro-levels.52
3. Impact
Two potential impacts must be considered: the possibility that AAS
will survive and mate with wild Atlantic salmon53 and/or that AAS will
47. CABI INT’L, supra note 2, at 227.
48. Id. at 120-121.
49. See, e.g., infra notes 53-54.
50. CABI INT’L, supra note 2, at 126.
51. AQUABOUNTY TECHNOLOGIES, INC., supra note 10, at 55 (referring to the
likelihood of “establishment” in terms of “the effect of the transgene on the fitness of the
animal for the ecosystem into which it is released”).
52. Id. at 33 (“The complexity of the interactions between these effects and, in turn,
their interactions with the environment, makes it difficult to predict the overall fitness of
GH-transgenic salmon in the environment relative to their wild counterparts.”); see also
CABI INT’L, supra note 2, at 178-79 (“Because such complex studies [those that account
for the various micro and macro issues in a wild environment] are difficult using only
confined experimental units, G x E effects will be an important source of incertitude in
ecological risk assessment for transgenic fish.”).
53. The CABI report identifies a number of different gene-flow scenarios, including a
purge scenario (although the least dangerous post-escape scenario, it is still dangerous
because the process of purging the GM genes from the wild stock can take generations), a
spread scenario (a high-risk scenario in which the GM fish can spread and compete with
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survive, compete with wild Atlantic salmon, and establish itself in the
same area as wild populations even in the absence of gene flow.54 These
two potential impacts, although technically different, both result in the
same dilemma: Atlantic salmon (whether second-generation AAS or
wild-AAS hybrids) containing AquaBounty’s patented genetic material
will find their way into non-GM fishermen’s nets.
C. Why We Cannot Rely on the AquaBounty Containment System
The AquaBounty system, despite its various flaws, relies on a strong
principle of redundancy. In this sense, it is likely one of the best
containment systems that could be developed and follows many of the
recommendations of the CABI report.55 A successful risk assessment,
however, balances the potential for escape against the potential for harm.
AquaBounty’s EA fails to make this balance by underestimating the
harm posed to non-GM fishermen from an AAS escape. First, the EA
underestimates the magnitude of the uncertainty in its escape and
survival models. An irreversible harm, the loss of native Atlantic
salmon, should not be balanced against the “certainties” of a narrowly
defined containment system when we cannot even predict the effects of
escape. Second, the EA fails to account for various stakeholders
involved in the harm being considered.56 Under the current regulatory
system utilized for GM animals, the FDA need only consider the
interests of AquaBounty, the object of the transgenic process (i.e., the
AAS), and the consumers of the AAS.57 Such an evaluation of harm fails
to consider the property interests of non-GM fishermen.58 Finally, the
the wild stocks for resources and space), and the Trojan gene scenario (a high risk
scenario in which the GM fish outcompetes the wild fish for reproductive opportunities,
only to have far weaker post-reproduction survival skills—leading to a collapse of entire
wild stocks). CABI INT’L, supra note 2, at 127-28, 132.
54. The CABI Report cites a number of potential consequences of an escape that do
not result in gene flow, including reproductive competition, food competition, migration
pattern disruption, changes in the number of predators, changes in predation rates on
other species, and changes in water flow. CABI INT’L, supra note 2, at 157-158.
55. See generally id. at Chapter 8.
56. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADEMIES, supra note 25, at 111
(noting that the FDA has informally agreed to consider effects on wild populations, but
no specific regulations or guidance exists to ensure quality or thoroughness of this
consideration and that the process is closed to public participation).
57. Id.
58. See Press Release, Senator Olympia Snowe, Senator Snowe Urges Halt of Review
Process for Genetically Engineered Salmon (Nov. 1, 2010), available at
http://www.asf.ca/news.php?id=595 (“Transgenic [GM] fish have the potential to
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weaknesses of this exceptionally narrow containment system are only
further compounded when we look to the future of AAS fish farming.
The current site produces a few hundred tons of fish and utilizes every
possible method of containment, despite the various costs mentioned
above.59 This current approach makes sense because the public relations
and development benefits of becoming certified by the FDA outweigh
the costs of such a system.60 But what happens when AquaBounty, a
self-described “technology company,” sells its technology to fish farmers
looking to produce on a scale more fit for mass consumption?
AquaBounty officials have already indicated their intention to sell AAS
to fish farmers who wish to operate in the United States (given reduced
travel costs) at predicted amounts of 2,000 tons—several times greater
than AquaBounty’s current production.61 Once profits are more
dependent on operating costs and factors of supply and demand, the
likelihood of decreased containment measures and resulting escapes will
increase.
The possibility of an AAS escape, therefore, is real but
immeasurable. Furthermore, the consequences of escape are quite real
but even more difficult to predict—AquaBounty admits this uncertainty
in its Briefing Packet to the FDA.62 The uncertainty surrounding the
quantification of risk and the magnitude of harm, however, should not
work as a paralytic for the planning of a legal response to various claims
and counterclaims that could result from an escape. Unfortunately, the
current state of our legal framework for approaching property interests in
GM animals is almost as uncertain as the risks of an AAS escape. Two
major areas of law—wildlife law and patent law—reveal the sources of
this uncertainty.

negatively affect our current wild capture fisheries, aquaculture operations, and other
sectors of the economy that depend on healthy marine and freshwater ecosystems. Thus
it is of paramount importance that this precedent-setting application be subject to a
suitable, rigorous environmental review process.”).
59. FISHERIES AND AQUACULTURE STATISTICS, supra note 1, at 114.
60. An AquaBounty executive has already indicated that the company’s main
objective is the sale of this technology to other fish farming companies, stating that “[w]e
do not wish to be the next Marine Harvest. We do not want to be the world’s largest
salmon producer. We want to supply technology and solutions to that industry.” Id. at
113.
61. See id. at 114.
62. AQUABOUNTY TECHNOLOGIES, INC., supra note 10, at 33.
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III. WILDLIFE LAW: THE FIRST CAPTURE AND PUBLIC TRUST
DOCTRINES
A. The First Capture Doctrine
For fishermen and hunters alike, it is well accepted law that “pursuit
alone vests no property or right in the huntsman.”63 Therefore, when
hunting foxes today or over two hundred years ago, it is best practice to
“mortally wound” or “greatly maim” your prey to ensure possession.64
This is the basic law of first capture and one of the bedrock principles of
American property law applied by courts and memorized by first-year
law students.65 The rule offers courts a bright line rule for determining
property ownership of a wild animal based on the act of killing or
significantly restricting the animal’s movement.66 The rule has also led,
in part, to the “tragedy of the commons,” encouraging the fastest and
most efficient capture of resources, despite potential waste.67 This
mentality has contributed to the depleted state of many fisheries,
including salmon.68
The minority in Pierson rejected the popular first capture doctrine
and instead emphasized the culture of the sport as well as the effort
advanced by the pursuing hunters.69 The dissenting justice posed the
following rhetorical question:
But who would keep a pack of hounds; or what gentleman, at the
sound of the horn, and at peep of day, would mount his steed,
and for hours together, “sub jove frigido,” or a vertical sun,
pursue the windings of this wily quadruped, if, just as night came
on, and his stratagems and strength were nearly exhausted, a
63. Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175, 177 (1805).
64. See id.
65. JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 17 (Vicki Been et al. eds., 6th ed. 2006).
66. Id.
67. DALE D. GOBLE & ERIC T. FREYFOGLE, WILDLIFE LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS
124 (Robert C. Clark et al. eds., 1st ed. 2002).
68. Alliance Against IFQs v. Brown, 84 F.3d 343, 344 (9th Cir. 1996). In discussing
the tragedy of the commons, the Ninth Circuit noted that:
[c]ommercial ocean fishing combines difficult and risky labor with large capital
investments to make money from a resource owned by no one, the fish. Unlimited
access tends to cause declining fisheries. The reason is that to get title to a fish, a
fisherman has to catch it before someone else does. This gives each fisherman an
incentive to invest in a fast, large boat and to fish as fast as possible.
Id.
69. See Pierson, 3 Cai. R. at 180-81 (Livingston, J., dissenting).
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saucy intruder, who had not shared in the honors or labors of the
chase, were permitted to come in at the death, and bear away in
triumph the object of pursuit?70
Justice Livingston’s question suggests that property rights, and also
our sympathies, should lie with the party that actually expends effort in
pursuit of the fox, as opposed to the “saucy intruder.”71 The majority’s
approach continues to be the common law rule. Justice Livingston’s
dissent, however, resonates in later interpretations of the first capture
doctrine.
In Shepard v. Leverson, for example, the New Jersey Supreme Court
held that ownership can be established through means other than basic
capture if the owner of the animals sufficiently identifies the animals as
his or her property.72 There, the plaintiff, Shepard, failed to properly
identify a number of oysters when he transferred them from a populated
area of the river to an area previously never populated by oysters.73 The
court held that when Shepard placed the oysters into the new portion of
the river without attaching some kind of “earmark” to each oyster, he
was abandoning his property back into “the common stock, from which it
cannot be distinguished” and relinquishing all his rights to the oysters.74
Despite its ultimate holding against Shepard, the majority had
sympathies similar to Livingston in his Pierson dissent because of the
effort expended by Shepard and the social benefits accruing from
harvested oyster beds.75 Some courts, therefore, have limited the first
capture doctrine in ways to empower the claims of the worthy hunter
over those of the “saucy intruder.”76 In addition to balancing the interests
of certainty in Pierson and fairness in Shepard, courts often find
themselves considering a third interest: the right of states to protect land
and wildlife under the public trust doctrine.

70. Id.
71. See id. at 182 (arguing that capture of wild animals should only require that the
pursuer be “within reach or have a reasonable prospect . . . of taking what he has thus
discovered”).
72. 2 N.J.L. 391 (N.J. 1808).
73. Id. at 372.
74. Id. (Shepard was transferring the oysters because the new area of the river was
apparently a fertile but unpopulated place for an oyster bed).
75. Id. at 373.
76. See, e.g., Brown v. Eckes, 160 N.Y.S. 489, 490-491 (N.Y. 1916) (holding that
escaped bees cannot be claimed property of their prior owner unless he maintains an
ability to identify them by keeping them in sight as they escape).
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B. Public Trust Doctrine: Foundation
The public trust doctrine is an exceptionally old common law
doctrine concerning state rights and duties to protect public lands.77
These common law roots, relying on the typical references to Roman law
as well as to Blackstone,78 lend an air of authority—but also
uncertainty—to the application of the public trust doctrine.79 Therefore,
it is important to understand the existing precedent before considering
possible extensions of the doctrine.
Three Supreme Court cases help to identify the foundation of the
public trust doctrine in terms of wildlife. Illinois Central Railroad v.
Illinois,80 seen by some as the “heart” of the public trust doctrine, serves
as a strong pronouncement of states’ rights of enforcement.81 Illinois
Central concerned a title dispute between Illinois and the Illinois Central
Railroad.82 The railroad claimed ownership of certain portions of land
around and under Lake Michigan through title given by the state.83 The
Court, however, held that this land could not have been validly
transferred to the railroad by the state legislature because it was owned
by Illinois in trust for the public.84 The Court described the title to the
lands as being “held in trust for the people of the State that they may
enjoy the navigation of the waters, carry on commerce over them, and
have liberty of fishing therein freed from the obstruction or interference
77. See, e.g., Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
78. See, e.g., Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 523, 526 (1896); see also Oliver A.
Houck, Why Do We Protect Endangered Species, and What Does That Say About
Whether Restrictions on Private Property to Protect Them Constitute ‘Takings?’, 80
IOWA L. REV. 297, 311 n.77 (1995) (“The majority in Hughes overruled the “ownership”
rationale announced in Geer, stating, ‘[W]e now conclude that challenges under the
Commerce Clause to state regulation of wild animals should be considered according to
the same general rule applied to state regulation of other natural resources.’ However,
the majority did not, and could not, overrule principles dating back to Roman law that
wild animals are the common property of the citizens of a state.”).
79. See Susan Horner, Embryo, not Fossil: Breathing Life into the Public Trust in
Wildlife, 35 LAND & WATER L. REV. 23, 24 (2000) (“While the public trust doctrine has
been universally accepted as a viable part of our legal heritage in the late Twentieth
Century, it is anything but a working tool in the practices of public interest and
conservation advocates across the nation.”).
80. 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
81. See Patrick Redmond, The Public Trust in Wildlife: Two Steps Forward, Two
Steps Back, 49 NAT. RESOURCES J. 249, 251 (2009) (referring to Illinois Central as “the
source of the modern American public trust doctrine”).
82. Ill. Cent. R.R., 146 U.S. at 443-44.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 452.
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of private parties.”85 Illinois Central, therefore, stands for the claim that
navigable waterways and the lands under these waterways are the most
traditionally protected public lands under even minimal public trust
considerations.86
Geer v. Connecticut is the next foundational case.87 Geer extends the
waterway rights defined in Illinois Central to wildlife, including Atlantic
salmon.88 The Geer Court upheld a Connecticut statute fining a man for
shooting birds in Connecticut during the proper hunting season because
he intended to transport them for sale outside of Connecticut state
boundaries.89 The Court found this rather restrictive statute valid based
on the state’s public trust power, holding that the power to control
wildlife “is to be exercised, like all other powers of government, as a
trust for the benefit of the people, and not as a prerogative for the
advantage of the government, as distinct from the people, or for the
benefit of private individuals as distinguished from the public good.”90
Geer, therefore, is a clear extension of public trust powers to wildlife
contained within a state’s borders.
Hughes v. Oklahoma, 91 however, overruled certain aspects of Geer
by refusing to allow a state to use the doctrine to interfere with interstate
commerce (i.e., the limitation placed on sale of game birds in another
state).92 The Court emphasized that states do not have any actual title or
ownership in wildlife for the same reasons that the hunter in Pierson
could not show ownership until the fox was killed.93 The Court,
however, also emphasized that they were not overruling the general
applicability of the public trust doctrine to states’ wildlife, but were
simply rejecting any concept of actual legal ownership that would upset
the supremacy of the Commerce Clause.94 The public trust doctrine,
85. Id.
86. Redmond, supra note 81, at 251.
87. 161 U.S. 519 (1896).
88. See Horner, supra note 79, at 39 (noting how a series of cases extending the
waterway rights of the traditional public trust doctrine to animals found within those
waterways “set the stage” for Geer and the ultimate recognition of states’ rights to
regulate all forms of wildlife).
89. Geer, 161 U.S. at 519-22.
90. Id. at 529.
91. 441 U.S. 322 (1979).
92. Id. at 335.
93. Id. at 334-35.
94. Id. at 335-36 (“The general rule we adopt in this case makes ample allowance for
preserving, in ways not inconsistent with the Commerce Clause, the legitimate state
concerns for conservation and protection of wild animals underlying the 19th-century
legal fiction of state ownership.”).
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therefore, remains a strong source of states’ rights to control waterways
and wildlife within their own borders, provided that proper deference is
given to the Commerce Clause.
The Court has focused on the doctrine’s coverage of certain areas
and interests. Patrick Redmond defines these first two issues in terms of
the doctrine’s geographic scope and protected uses.95 A third issue,
however, has been left relatively underdeveloped by the Court: the
application of the doctrine to establish states’ obligations.
C. Public Trust Doctrine: States’ Obligations
Application of the public trust doctrine occurs in two possible ways:
rights and obligations. The foundational cases explored above concern
the application of rights. Illinois Central established Illinois’s right to
regain its land, while Geer extended this right to the control of wildlife.
Hughes, meanwhile, limited this right by highlighting that state
ownership was a legal fiction that could not overcome the limits of the
Commerce Clause. The Court, therefore, has chosen to emphasize the
rights of states to protect lands and property held in trust.
In contrast, some commentators suggest that the states’ obligation to
enforce the interests of the trust is the doctrine’s most important function.
Professor Joseph Sax was one of the first and most famous of these
proponents.96 In Liberating the Public Trust Doctrine from its Historical
Shackles, he advances the thesis that “[o]ur task is to identify the
trustee’s obligation with an eye toward insulating those expectations that
support social, economic and ecological systems from avoidable
destabilization and disruption.”97
Sax’s vision of the public trust doctrine as obligating state action on
behalf of and in response to the claims of its beneficiaries, although
absent from Supreme Court precedent, has seen some successes at the
state level.98 Courts in Louisiana and California have indicated a strong
commitment to exploring the obligations imposed by the public trust
doctrine, so long as suits are brought in their proper form against state

95. Redmond, supra note 81, at 258.
96. See, e.g., Joseph L. Sax, Liberating the Public Trust Doctrine from Its Historical
Shackles, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 185, 193 (1980).
97. Id.
98. See, e.g., Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Superior Court of Alpine Cnty., 658 P.2d 709,
732 (Cal. 1983); Save Ourselves, Inc. v. La. Envtl. Control Comm’n, 452 So.2d 1152
(La. 1984).
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agencies.99 Louisiana is seen as a leader in its “commitment to the public
trust doctrine.”100 The leading case in Louisiana, Save Ourselves, Inc.,
uses Louisiana’s constitution to establish the state’s obligations to protect
trust resources.101 In that case, the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed the
approval of certain permits for hazardous waste discharge because the
state agency did not sufficiently investigate the potential for harm.102 In
doing so, it noted that the Louisiana Constitution codified principles of
the public trust doctrine and, as a result, the public agency in charge of
issuing these permits was bound as the trustee to consider issues
affecting the interests of the public.103 The court stated that “the
commission’s role as the representative of the public interest does not
permit it to act as an umpire passively calling balls and strikes for
adversaries appearing before it; the rights of the public must receive
active and affirmative protection at the hands of the commission”
(emphasis added).104 This affirmative obligation is precisely what Sax
and other commentators envision as the role of the public trust
doctrine.105
California’s highest court, following a similar model in National
Audubon Society v. Superior Court of Alpine County, held that the
California water rights system, which favored using a highly unique
watershed for water production purposes, must be considered in
conjunction with countervailing public trust concerns, which favored
protection of the unique area for environmental and recreational

99. Trust obligations are limited to the states as trustees. Thus, any suit must be
brought against the state for failure to enforce its trust obligation even if a private party is
causing the harm. This is because the state, not the public beneficiary seeking suit, must
enforce the trust. See, e.g., Ctr. for Biological Diversity, Inc., v. FPL Grp., Inc., 166 Cal.
App. 4th 1349, 1367-68 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (dismissing a suit brought against private
operators of wind farms in California that were killing birds because the proper defendant
would have been the state agency that had approved the wind farms).
100. Horner, supra note 79, at 58.
101. Save Ourselves, 452 So.2d at 1157.
102. Id. at 1160 (“We cannot determine from this record that the agency fully
understood its function or properly exercised the discretion it has been given. The
commission did not assign reasons for its decision, and its factual findings do not
sufficiently illumine its decision-making process.”).
103. Id. at 1154 (“The public trust doctrine was continued by the 1974 Louisiana
Constitution, which specifically lists air and water as natural resources, commands
protection, conservation and replenishment of them insofar as possible and consistent
with health, safety and welfare of the people, and mandates the legislature to enact laws
to implement this policy.”).
104. Id. at 1157.
105. Sax, supra note 96, at 188-89.
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purposes.106 After explaining the history of the public trust, as well as
evolving public opinion on the importance of conservation and
environmentalism, the court stated that the public trust doctrine is “more
than an affirmation of state power to use public property for public
purposes. It is an affirmation of the duty of the state to protect the
people’s common heritage of streams, lakes, marshlands and
tidelands.”107 In addition to recognizing the sometimes obligatory nature
of the public trust doctrine, the court also expanded the purpose of the
trust, which was typically thought to encompass waterways and wildlife
management after Illinois Central and Geer.108 It noted that the public
uses protected as trust resources are “sufficiently flexible to encompass
changing public needs” including the “preservation of those lands
[tidelands] in their natural state, so that they may serve as ecological
units.”109 California, therefore, has expanded not only the application of
the doctrine to include obligations, but has also expanded the doctrine to
recognize a new purpose beyond access and use of waterways:
preservation of waterways for environmental and recreational
purposes.110
Louisiana and California, however, do not represent the majority
state-level approach to the public trust doctrine. Surveys of state
approaches highlight Louisiana and California as the exceptions for their
expansion and use of the trust.111 Nevertheless, the presence of these
cases, work by commentators, and the growing awareness of
environmental concerns in the United States suggest that despite its
contentious and ambiguous application by the states, the public trust
doctrine will continue to see expanded use.
D. Applying Wildlife Law to the Hypothetical Escape
An application of wildlife law to the hypothetical situation presented
in Part I reveals an internal contradiction for determining possession of
GM animals. The AAS that escaped in our hypothetical situation were
106. Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, 658 P.2d at 712.
107. Id. at 724.
108. Id. at 719.
109. Id.
110. Id. (“There is a growing public recognition that one of the most important public
uses of the tidelands—a use encompassed within the tidelands trust—is the preservation
of those lands in their natural state, so that they may serve as ecological units for
scientific study, as open space, and as environments which provide food and habitat for
birds and marine life, and which favorably affect the scenery and climate of the area.”).
111. See, e.g., Horner, supra note 79, at 58.
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created from animals that were once wild, not unlike the oysters in
Shepard.112 The escaped AAS, therefore, could be considered wild
animals returned to the “common stock.”113 If this was the case, then the
fishermen, by virtue of the capture doctrine, would have lawful
possession of the AAS they catch in the wild. The genetically modified
AAS, however, are very different from the wild oysters in Shepard.
Shepard, as the court noted, did not attach an earmark to each of his
oysters.114 AquaBounty, however, followed the Shepard holding without
even intending to apply an “earmark.” Each AAS has a unique genetic
makeup, which serves as an “earmark” distinguishing it from wild
Atlantic salmon. This genetic makeup results in explicit physical
differences (i.e., phenotypic changes) and invisible internal differences
(i.e., genotypic changes) from wild salmon. AquaBounty, therefore,
would have little difficulty identifying AAS after an examination and
genetic testing by a scientist, such as the one who visited the fish market.
The “earmark” in Shepard, however, was more likely intended as notice
to other parties (e.g., the fishermen in the hypothetical situation) as
opposed to a reminder for Shepard. Wildlife law, therefore, leaves an
unsatisfying contradiction for determining ownership of escaped AAS:
are GM animals, initially wild animals before being genetically altered,
wild animals when they escape or do they somehow remain the property
of the individual responsible for altering their genetic makeup?
The public trust doctrine raises a second set of concerns. What, if
any, public property rights have been injured by the hybridization and
possible extinction of wild salmon resulting from an AAS escape? An
injury will certainly have occurred, given the loss of “biodiversity” (i.e.,
genetic variety).115 The “ecological unit” concept in National Audubon
Society would consider such an injury, but, as noted earlier, the
California approach is the exception to the rule. In addition, access to
state fisheries, one of the most traditionally protected public trust
resources,116 will also be lost if wild populations are replaced by AAS.
However, some states may recognize AAS farms as beneficiaries of the

112. Shepard, 2 N.J.L. at 373.
113. Id. at 372.
114. Id.
115. CABI INT’L, supra note 2, at 131 (noting that sufficient biodiversity within a
species is a necessary element for survival).
116. See Redmond, supra note 81, at 251 (“The source of the modern American public
trust doctrine was the U.S. Supreme Court’s recognition . . . of a public trust held by
states over navigable waterways, for the purposes of navigation, commerce, and
fishing.”).
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public trust and treat AAS escapes as no more harmful than current
problems surrounding overfishing by non-GM fishermen.117
Our hypothetical fishermen, therefore, have very uncertain protection
from the impacts of an AAS escape under current wildlife law.
Moreover, wildlife law only guides our analysis of the hypothetical
escape prior to the most significant event: the sale of AAS. For the legal
implications after our hypothetical fishermen sell AAS, we must turn to
patent law.
IV. PATENT LAW AND THE TREND FOR GREATER PROTECTION OF GM
ORGANISMS
Intellectual property law addresses many of the concerns raised in
Livingston’s dissent in Pierson. Justice Livingston, however, might have
had difficulty understanding the connection in 1805. John Locke’s labor
theory allows an individual to possess, for example, a fence he made
because he mixed his labor with the creation of that fence.118 So how can
an individual mix his labor in the capture of a fox the same way he can in
the creation of a fence? In Justice Livingston’s time, the answer was that
a man cannot create a fox, no matter how many hours he spends hunting
“sub jove frigido.”119 His only means for establishing lawful possession,
therefore, was through capture.120
In a modern context, however, specific types of livings organisms
can be “created” in a technical sense through processes of genetic
modification. The foundation of patent rights in genetically modified
organisms has two interrelated bases: the traditionally broad approach to
allowing utility patents121 and the continued expansion of this protection
to new GM organisms, particularly GM plants owned by Monsanto.122
The GM plant patent cases, although not directly discussing GM animals,
are a necessary analogy to AAS because no case law currently exists for
the escape of patented GM animals.
117. Robin Kundis Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Eastern Public Trust Doctrines:
Classifications of States, Property Rights, and State Summaries, 16 PENN ST. ENVTL. L.
REV. 1, 63, 67 (2007) (noting that states like Maine are conflicted about whether to define
currently existing, non-GM aquaculture sites as “fishing” under traditional trust
definitions).
118. See generally JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Peter Laslett ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1988).
119. Pierson, 3 Cai. R. at 180-81. The phrase translates to “under cold skies.”
120. Id.
121. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980).
122. See infra Part IV.B.
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A. The Foundation of Patent Rights in Living GM Organisms
The initial formation of patent law predates any consideration of
genetically modified organisms.123 The power to grant patents is
provided explicitly in the Constitution, which gives Congress the power
“[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries.”124 From this Constitutional grant
of power, Congress enacted 35 U.S.C. § 101, which defines the range of
possible subject matter for patents.125 This range is based on the Patent
Act of 1793, which very broadly defined the possible subject matter as
“any new and useful art, machine, manufacture, or composition of
matter, or any new and useful improvement on any art, machine,
manufacture or composition of matter.”126 Congress has kept this same
exact language in 35 U.S.C. § 101, aside from changing “art” to
“process,” so that there remains a very broad range of patentable subject
matter.127
In 1980, the Supreme Court interpreted § 101 in a manner consistent
with this earlier Act and Thomas Jefferson’s belief that “ingenuity should
receive liberal encouragement.”128 The majority in Chakrabarty, relying
on 1952 Committee Reports for § 101, found patentable subject matter to
“include anything under the sun that is made by man,” with the only
limits being “[t]he laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract
ideas.”129 Chakrabarty is a landmark case not because it reinforces the
“philosophy” of Jefferson or the intent of the drafters of the 1952
amendments, but rather because it applies this intent to the creation of
living organisms, an issue not foreseeable by Jefferson or the 1952
drafters. Charkrabarty, a scientist for the General Electric Corporation,
created a living organism in the form of a bacterium that was capable of
breaking down crude oil.130 The United States Patent and Trademark
Office (USPTO) and Court of Customs and Patent Appeals both rejected
Chakrabarty’s patent application because living organisms were not then
123. See Act of Feb. 21, 1793, ch. 11, §1, 1 Stat. 318.
124. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
125. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006); see also id. § 102 (requiring novelty); id. at § 102
(requiring an invention be non-obvious); id. at § 112 (requiring an enabling written
description).
126. Act of Feb. 21, 1793, ch. 11, §1, 1 Stat. 318, 319.
127. See 35 U.S.C. §101 (2006).
128. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 308.
129. Id. at 309.
130. Id. at 305 (the bacterium was intended for use in cleaning up oil spills).
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considered patentable under § 101.131 The Supreme Court reversed these
decisions based on the broad interpretation outlined above and a labor
theory argument which focused on the fact that Chakrabarty himself had
created a bacterium with “markedly different characteristics from any
found in nature and one having the potential for significant utility.”132
The patenting of living organisms, as a result of Chakrabarty and the
trend towards greater protection, has gone far beyond oil-eating bacteria.
In 1984, Harvard University filed a patent application for what has
become know as the “Harvard Mouse.”133 In essence, it was a mouse
engineered to be more susceptible to cancer than common mice, and
therefore an aid in cancer research efforts.134 Unlike earlier applications
for similar subjects, however, Harvard took the unique step of claiming
not only the procedural and manufacturing elements of creating the
mouse, but also the mouse itself.135 This was possible given the broad
ruling only a few years earlier in Chakrabarty.
The move from patenting an oil-eating microorganism to an animal
is not a small one. Canada’s highest court rejected the very same
Harvard application accepted by the U.S. Patent Office based on a
distinction between lower and higher life forms.136 Plant patent acts
similar to those in the U.S. and the “common sense differences” between
lower forms of life and plants/animals led the Canadian Court to accept
the patent application in terms of process, but reject any actual claims for

131. Id. at 306.
132. Id. at 310. A four member minority tried unsuccessfully to undermine this trend
towards broader patent protection. The minority claimed that later plant patent acts in
1930 and 1970 would be made redundant by the majority’s overly broad interpretation of
§ 101. Id. at 320.
Legal scholars reinforce the minority’s argument, pointing to
historical records and more contemporary records that explicitly exclude plants from
utility patents under § 101. Malla Pollack, Originalism, J.E.M., and the Food Supply, or
Will the Real Decision Maker Please Stand Up?, 19 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 495, 505-07
(2004) (noting a complete absence of plant utility patents pre-1836, and citing to
Committee Reports from legislation creating the plant patent, which state that “[a] new
variety [of seed] once it has left the hands of the breeder may be reproduced in unlimited
quantity by all”).
133. U.S. Patent No. 4,736,866 (filed Apr. 12, 1988). At this time, the patented mouse
was titled “Transgenic non-human mammals,” which would later describe any number of
comparable experiments following the Harvard mouse, including the AAS.
134. 866 Patent at col.1 l.39, col.3 ls.16-19.
135. Id. at col.9 ls.35-38, col.10 ls.1-2. (“A transgenic non-human mammal all of
whose germ cells and somatic cells contain a recombinant activated oncogene sequence
introduced into said mammal, or an ancestor of said mammal, at an embryonic stage.”).
136. Comm’r of Patents v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll., [2002] 4 S.C.R. 45
(Can.).
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ownership of the mouse itself.137 The United States and Canada,
however, would later find common ground in allowing utility patents to
be applied to GM plants owned by Monsanto. These U.S. and Canadian
Monsanto cases make up the second, more modern basis for the patent
protection of GM organisms.
B. The Modern Basis for GM Organism Patents
1. Expansion of § 101 Protection to GM Plants
The broad subject matter and superior protection of a utility patent
has been essential to the success of biotech companies such as Monsanto
and AquaBounty. The plant patent acts that were the foundation of the
minority’s argument in Chakrabarty, a weaker source of protection, do
not offer the same exclusivity and power of control of a utility patent.138
In J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred International, therefore, the
Court granted agricultural businesses the power to patent seeds under §
101.139 J.E.M. had a licensing agreement for the sale of its corn seeds.140
Pioneer, a seed seller, had purchased J.E.M seeds without a license and
then resold those seeds.141 J.E.M. brought a patent infringement suit and
Pioneer responded by challenging the validity of J.E.M.’s patent.142 In
essence, Pioneer claimed that the patent was invalid for the corn seeds
because Congress had provided the Plant Protection Act (PPA) and Plant
Variety Protection Act (PVPA) as the exclusive means for patenting
plants.143 The majority, however, found that § 101 and the PPA/PVPA
could coexist, rejecting Pioneer’s repeal by implication argument.144
Justices Breyer and Stevens, in dissent, essentially adopted Pioneer’s
repeal by implication argument (i.e., that the presence of more specific

137. Id. at 46.
138. Pollack, supra note 132, at 504-06 (noting that these plant patent acts allow
farmers to save seeds and conduct research on patented plants, two major issues for
agricultural corporations such as Monsanto, who do not want farmers saving their GM
seeds for next year’s harvest).
139. J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124 (2001).
140. Id. at 127.
141. Id. at 128.
142. Id. at 128-29.
143. Id. at 129.
144. Id. at 145-46 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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statutes for the patenting of plants would make invalid any attempt to
patent a plant under § 101).145
Putting aside the conflicting opinions in J.E.M. Ag Supply, the
ultimate concern is the effect of extended utility patent protection on the
property rights of non-GM farmers and fishermen. Under PVPA,
farmers could conduct research on seeds and save seeds for future
harvest instead of purchasing new seeds every year.146 Such patent
protection did little for biotechnology companies hoping to enforce broad
licensing agreements against farmers saving their seeds for subsequent
generations. The holding in J.E.M. Ag Supply, however, gave these
companies the exact protection they were seeking in the form of utility
patents for GM plants, GM animals, and “anything under the sun.”
2. The Consequences of Patenting “Anything Under the Sun”
The traditionally broad approach to granting patent rights, as noted
earlier, began long before the creation of GM organisms. A continued
application of this trend to protect “anything under the sun” to GM
organisms, therefore, has had and will continue to have a number of
unforeseeable consequences. Living organisms, such as plants and
animals, are self-replicating, in the sense that they reproduce themselves.
This means that living organisms do not conform well to the “exhaustion
doctrine,” which eliminates many of the patent holder’s rights after the
sale of patented seeds.147 As a result, the protections granted to
145. Id. at 152 (“Even a prescient court would have had to say, as of 1931, that the
1930 Plant Patent Act had, in amending the Utility Patent Statute, placed the subject
matter of the PPA—namely plants—outside the scope of the words ‘manufacture, or
composition of matter.’”).
146. 7 U.S.C. § 2543 (1994) (“[I]t shall not infringe any right hereunder for a person to
save seed produced by the person from seed obtained, or descended from seed obtained,
by authority of the owner of the variety for seeding purposes and use such saved seed in
the production of a crop for use on the farm of the person, or for sale as provided in this
section.”). The process of seed saving is very old and in many ways is the precursor to
genetic modification because by saving the best seeds farmers were able to ensure better
harvest each year. See, e.g., Tempe Smith, Going to Seed?: Using Monsanto as a Case
Study to Examine the Patent and Antitrust Implications of the Sale and Use of Genetically
Modified Seeds, 61 ALA. L. REV. 629, 634 (2010) (“Saving seed is a long-established
practice in agrarian societies; seed saving has been practiced in the United States since
before the Pilgrims came in 1620 and throughout the world for over 10,000 years.”)
(citations omitted).
147. Rita S. Heimes, Post-Sale Restrictions on Patented Seeds: Which Law Governs?,
10 WAKE FOREST I.P. L. REV. 98, 98 (2010) (“Generally, when someone purchases a
patented good she is free to use it, take it apart and rebuild it, and even re-sell it to
another without infringing the patent through the ‘first sale’ or ‘exhaustion doctrine.’”);
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companies like Monsanto are so broad that they can implicate
unintentional infringers who harvest GM crops that have blown onto
their lands and reproduced themselves without the farmer’s
knowledge.148 The unique self-replicating nature of seeds and the
common practice of seed saving have resulted in a series of cases that
unfortunately sustain the trend of greater patent protection for living
organisms that started with Chakrabarty.
In Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit settled the conflict between self-replication and the
exhaustion doctrine.149 Scruggs, a cotton and soybean farmer, had
purchased GM seeds from Monsanto, but never signed the licensing
agreement to refrain from reusing subsequent generations of saved
seeds.150 These particular seeds, like most Monsanto seeds, are designed
so that farmers can spray Monsanto’s RoundUp pesticide directly onto
the crops without any harm to the GM plants, while killing any
surrounding non-GM plants.151 Scruggs relied on a number of
arguments, including the exhaustion doctrine, to claim that once the
seeds had been sold to him he was free to save them to use for a second
generation.152 The court responded sharply, stating that “[t]he fact that a
patented technology can replicate itself does not give a purchaser the
right to use replicated copies of the technology.”153 The court went so far
as to claim that applying the exhaustion doctrine to subsequent
generations of seeds “would eviscerate the rights of the patent holder”
despite Monsanto’s continued ability to sell the RoundUp necessary for
treatment of GM plants harvested from saved seeds.154 Scruggs lost his
exhaustion argument and was subject to an injunction based on
Monsanto’s patent enforcement rights under 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1).155
In addition to the unique issue of self-replication, the trend toward
greater patent protection for living organisms has upset a way of life for

see also Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 459 F.3d 1328, 1335-36 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“The first
sale/patent exhaustion doctrine establishes that the unrestricted first sale by a patentee of
his patented article exhausts his patent rights in the article.”).
148. See, e.g., Monsanto Canada Inc. v. Schmeiser [2004] 1 S.C.R. 902 (Can.).
149. See generally Scruggs, 459 F.3d at 1328.
150. Id. at 1333.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 1335.
153. Id. at 1336.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 1338 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2006) (“[T]he right to exclude others
from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout the United
States or importing the invention into the United States.”)).
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many conventional and organic farmers. The inability to reuse saved
seeds, a technique as old as U.S. farming itself, has resulted in a strong
emotional response from farmers and activists.156 Recent reports,
furthermore, suggest that Monsanto controls around 95% of all soybeans
in the United States and 85% of all corn.157 The obvious result is a lack
of choice in U.S. seed markets.158 Another less obvious result is that
innocent farmers are being held liable for infringement because selfreplicating plants cover such a vast area of U.S. farmlands that they can
easily cross-contaminate non-GM crops. There are so many GM farms
at this point that their crops can establish themselves through gene-flow
to non-GM fields by simply blowing in the wind or being transferred by
bees.159 Monsanto denies that they would ever bring suit against farmers
who did not knowingly infringe their patents in a substantial way.160 But
popular anecdotes about settlements suggest otherwise.161 Admittedly,
there is no Monsanto case directly on point in the United States. It is,
however, well accepted precedent that intent is not required for patent
infringement.162 In Monsanto Canada v. Schmeiser, for example,

156. See, e.g., FOOD, INC. (Magnolia Pictures 2008) (covering the struggle of Moe Parr,
a seed cleaner, who for years had helped farmers save seeds for next year’s harvest); see
also Monsanto Co. v. Parr, 545 F. Supp. 2d 836 (N.D. Ind. 2008).
157. Christopher Leonard, Monsanto Uses Patent Law to Control Most of U.S. Corn,
Soy Seed Market, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Dec. 16, 2009, http://www.cleveland.com/
nation/index.ssf/2009/12/monsanto_uses_patent_law_to_co.html.
158. Id. (reporting that Monsanto is under investigation by the Federal government and
a few states for potential antitrust violations).
159. Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 2743, 2755 n.3 (2010).
160. Monsanto Answers Your Questions About the Movie Food, Inc., MONSANTO,
http://www.monsanto.com/food-inc/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Jan. 19, 2011) (“It
has never been, nor will it be, Monsanto policy to exercise its patent rights where trace
amounts of our patented traits are present in farmers’ fields as a result of inadvertent
means. We have no motivation to conduct business in this manner, nor have we ever
attempted to conduct business in this manner—and we surely would not prevail in the
courts if we did.”).
161. Armen Keteyian, Agricultural Giant Battles Small Farmers, CBS NEWS, Apr. 26,
2008, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/04/26/eveningnews/main4048288.shtml-Popular. Keteyian discusses the Runyons, farmers in Indiana, who assert that Monsanto
illegally trespassed on their land to gain samples of seeds and then threatened a patent
infringement suit. Monsanto eventually dropped the claims, but not until after the
Runyons claim they almost lost their farm. Id.
162. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 527 U.S.
627, 645 (1999) (“Actions predicated on direct patent infringement, however, do not
require any showing of intent to infringe; instead, knowledge and intent are considered
only with respect to damages.” (citations omitted)).
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Monsanto was allowed to bring suit against a potentially unintentional
infringer in Canada.163
In Schmeiser, the Canadian Supreme Court found Schmeiser, a
canola farmer, guilty of infringement despite the fact that he never signed
a purchase agreement with Monsanto or used the RoundUp pesticides
necessary for benefiting from use of Monsanto’s GM canola.164 The
Schmeiser opinion makes two major conclusions extending the trend of
patent protection: a rejection of a “gene-flow” defense and the court’s
broad definition of “use” for purposes of infringement.
From the very beginning of the case, the court makes it abundantly
clear that it was not willing to accept a defense based on gene-flow.165 It
only wished to deal with the issue of applying “established principles of
patent law.”166 As a result, the factual dispute between Monsanto (who
claimed that 95-98% of Schmeiser’s crops were GM canola) and
Schmeiser (who claimed it was only one of his various fields that
contained GM canola) was never considered by the Canadian Supreme
Court.167 Deference to the lower court’s fact finding is not surprising.
The fact, however, that both courts acknowledged the likely effects of
gene-flow but were nevertheless unconcerned with determining the
degree of its impact or the possibility of such a defense in future cases
indicates a clear preference for avoiding such factually complicated but
important considerations.168 The very real impact of gene-flow was seen
only a few years later, when Schmeiser forced Monsanto to settle in a
separate suit where he had definitive proof of gene-flow.169 Ignoring
163. Robert Stack, How Do I Use This Thing? What’s It Good for Anyway? A Study of
the Meaning of Use and the Test for Patent Infringement in the Monsanto Canada Inc. v.
Schmeiser Decisions, 18 I.P.J. 277, 286 (2005) (“There was no general finding that
Schmeiser was aiming to grow a pure Round-up resistant crop on which to spray or that
he had other long term plans for exploiting the Transgene. Nor did the FCTD find that
Schmeiser was preparing to spray in 1998. Schmeiser testified that he would have needed
far more Roundup than he had purchased in 1998 in order to spray in that year, and
neither Justice MacKay nor Monsanto challenged the accuracy or significance of this
testimony.”).
164. Id.
165. Schmeiser, 1 S.C.R. 902, at para. 2.
166. Id. at para. 3.
167. Id. at paras. 64-65.
168. Id. at paras. 66-68.
169. Matt Hartley, Grain Farmer Claims Moral Victory in Seed Battle Against
Monsanto, GLOBE & MAIL (CANADA) (March 20, 2008), available at
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/article26378.ece
(describing
Percy
Schmeiser’s successful settlement with Monsanto after the second time his crops were
cross contaminated by GM crops and his refusal to sign what he referred to as a “gag
order” as a term of the settlement).
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gene-flow allowed the court to go directly to the issue of defining use,
which had even worse consequences for Schmeiser.
Monsanto’s GM plants, as described earlier, are useful because they
allow farmers to spray RoundUp pesticides directly onto crops without
harming the growth of those crops. Planting GM canola without
subsequent use of RoundUp, therefore, would make no sense.170 Percy
Schmeiser, however, never used RoundUp on his GM crops.171 How
then did he infringe Monsanto’s patent without ever using the GM
canola’s one uniquely engineered feature? The court was able to find
infringement, despite this lack of functional use, because it defined “use”
exceptionally broadly. The court rejected the contention that the patent
existed only for the sake of the specific RoundUp resistant genes and
instead contended that the patent granted Monsanto full rights to the
canola plant itself.172 Therefore, the mere presence of Monsanto’s
specific genes in the entire genetic make-up of the canola plant was
sufficient to find infringement because Schmeiser sowed and cultivated
the seeds.173
There is some irony in the majority’s holding. The majority, unlike
the dissent, did indeed claim it was possible to own an entire plant
merely by virtue of adding a small amount of genetic variation. It
compared this variation to a “lego block” in a larger overall “lego
structure,” which is the wild plant prior to genetic modification.174 The
damages remedy based on this analogy reveals the contradiction and
irony in the majority’s reasoning. After taking Schmeiser all the way to
the Canadian Supreme Court in defense of their patented GM canola,
Monsanto was awarded nothing in damages.175 The accounting method
for determining damages required that Schmeiser pay Monsanto for the
difference between the “profit attributable to the invention and his profit
170. This is different from the factual situation in Scruggs, where the defendant also
claimed that he was not using RoundUp, but only the cotton seeds containing the
resistance. Scruggs wanted to use the GM cotton not for its RoundUp resistance, but for
its Bollgard trait, which imparted the plant with a genetic resistance to certain insects that
did not require the use of pesticides. See Scruggs, 459 F.3d at 1339.
171. Schmeiser, 1 S.C.R. 902 at para. 81.
172. Id. at para. 80.
173. Id. at para. 92.
174. Id. at para. 42. But see id. at para. 156 (Arbour, J., dissenting) (“There is no
genuinely useful analogy between growing a plant in which every cell and every cell of
all its progeny are remotely traceable to the genetically modified cell and contain the
chimeric gene and putting a zipper in a garment, or tires on a car or constructing with
Lego blocks. The analogies are particularly weak when it is considered that the plant can
subsequently grow, reproduce, and spread with no further human intervention.”).
175. Id. at para. 105.
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had he used the best non-infringing option.”176 The court found that the
Schmeisers’ profits “arose solely from qualities of their crop that cannot
be attributed to the invention.”177 These attributes of the “best noninfringing option” (i.e., everything but the genetic variation), which
would be found in the “parent” canola plants Monsanto used to develop
its GM canola or in the seeds saved by non-GM farmers for centuries,
nevertheless are patentable by Monsanto based on the lego analogy.
Furthermore, while this reasoning protected Schmeiser from losing his
farm, it also gave Monsanto and similar biotech companies the greatest
possible protection for their GM crops. The parallel victories between
greater patent protection and expansion of GM crops are hard to ignore.
A recent case, however, offers some hope for non-GM farmers, and
perhaps non-GM fishermen.
In June 2010, Monsanto was back in court protecting their property
interests in a different RoundUp Ready crop: RoundUp Ready Alfalfa.178
In Monsanto v. Geertson Seed Farms, Monsanto responded to an
injunction that barred further planting of their GM Alfalfa based on
gene-flow concerns until completion of a full Environmental Impact
Statement pursuant to NEPA.179 The plaintiffs in the case, alfalfa
farmers and food safety groups, had successfully challenged a Finding of
No Significant Impact under the more lenient and abbreviated
Environmental Assessment used to approve the GM Alfalfa.180 The
Court reversed the injunction because it was not possible to prove the
required showing of irreparable injury under the four-factor test for
approving a permanent injunction.181 The holding, however, was narrow
because the failure to prove irreparable injury stemmed from the broad
nature of the injunction, which barred all planting of GM Alfalfa during
the pending EIS.182 Nevertheless, the Court’s opinion actually offered
non-GM farmers two powerful tools for proving the injurious effects of
gene-flow from GM plants.
First, the opinion from the lower court, which was not disputed by
the parties on appeal, indicated that the failure to address major issues in
an EA can result in a violation of NEPA and the need for a more
thorough EIS.183 Second, although no irreparable injury was proven,
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

Id. at para. 102.
Id. at para. 104.
See Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 130 S. Ct. 2743 (2010).
Id. at 2749-52.
Id. at 2750-51.
Id. at 2759-61.
Id.
Id. at 2751-53.
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given the broad remedy granted, the Court was clear that gene-flow or
the mere threat of gene-flow grants standing to seek an injunction.184
While the “victory” in Geertson was minimal, the case demonstrated
a recognition by the Court that the property interests of biotech
companies, which seem to stretch back in time to Jefferson’s Patent Act
of 1793, are finally being balanced against competing interests of
conventional farmers. In Geertson, the Court recognized both an
environmental and economic injury to the non-GM farmers in this
balancing of interests.185 This recognition, however, has taken years
since the initial GM plants of Monsanto were first grown in the United
States in 1996.186 Is it too late? And what help will it be for non-GM
fishermen, who will soon be entering the even newer world of property
rights in GM animals?
C. Applying Patent Law to the Hypothetical Escape
Patent law, even more so than wildlife law, has adverse
consequences for the hypothetical fishermen described in Part I.187
Wildlife law does not resolve the issue of possession of AAS hybrids nor
does it provide the protection non-GM fishermen might receive from the
public trust doctrine.188 Patent law, however, is quite clear that the trend
favors protection of intellectual property owned by biotechnology
companies.189 The patent for AAS, therefore, would be considered
infringed upon as soon as the fishermen sold escaped AAS or AAS
hybrids. Much like Percy Schmeiser, non-GM fishermen would be liable
for infringement after having sold fish containing the genetic “lego
blocks” inserted into AAS by AquaBounty, whether the fish are escaped
first generation AAS, later generations of AAS, or simply AAS-wild
hybrids expressing the specific AAS genetic advantages.

184. Id. at 2755 (“Such harms [i.e., burdens from investigating and protecting against
gene-flow], which respondents will suffer even if their crops are not actually infected
with the Roundup ready gene, are sufficiently concrete to satisfy the injury-in-fact prong
of the constitutional standing analysis. Those harms are readily attributable to [the
Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service’s] deregulation decision, which, as the
District Court found, gives rise to a significant risk of gene-flow to non-geneticallyengineered varieties of alfalfa.”).
185. Id. at 2756.
186. See Food, Inc. Movie, MONSANTO, http://www.monsanto.com/foodinc/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Mar. 19, 2011).
187. See supra Part I.
188. See supra Part III.
189. See supra Part III.
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Thus, patent law, as it currently stands, makes it clear that the selfreplicating nature of wild animals, the fishermen’s innocence, and geneflow are not valid defenses against infringement claims. The fishermen,
despite never having heard of AAS, will be held liable for infringing the
AAS patent.
V. CONCLUSION
The current legal framework for determining property rights in AAS
lacks clarity and equity. Wildlife law is bound by an internal
contradiction: capture is the dominant principle, but proper identification
can trump capture. However, the mostly invisible genetic “earmarks” of
AAS fail to give notice to anyone other than AquaBounty, which defeats
the purpose of notice as developed in Shepard. Ownership from a
property standpoint, furthermore, is only an important pre-sale
consideration and fisherman will receive no benefit from being able to
possess, but not sell their salmon catches.190 The current state of wildlife
law for determining possession of GM animals escaped into the wild,
therefore, offers no legal certainty of possession for either the patent
holders or captors of escaped GM animals. Courts should further
develop the basic concepts of identification, as provided in Shepard, in a
way that takes into account the unique nature of GM animals without
imputing identification to parties based on largely invisible genetic
earmarks.
Patent law, which will be the focus for purposes of the post-sale
disputes surrounding AAS, lacks equity. Innocent fishermen, under the
current case law, will be subject to liability for the unintentional sale of
AAS, despite their best efforts to capture wild Atlantic salmon.
Fishermen, therefore, need remedies addressing the inequities in patent
law. Conceptually, it is useful to conceive of a non-GM fishermen’s
remedies as existing in two broad categories: pre-escape remedies, which
protect their existing rights, and post-escape remedies, which respond to
possible AquaBounty suits. Courts and legislatures should use these
existing but insufficient remedies as tools for establishing a more
190. For the purposes of AAS, therefore, wildlife law is far less important than patent
law, which has post-sale consequences. Not all GM animals are only valuable when sold
and consumed, however. Situations may also arise in which courts find themselves
having to determine the ownership of GM pets with economic and sentimental value,
such as a glowing pig. See, e.g., Sheryl Lawrence, Comment, What Would You Do with a
Fluorescent Green Pig?: How Novel Transgenic Products Reveal Flaws in the
Foundational Assumptions for the Regulation of Biotechnology, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 201,
259-63 (2007).
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equitable balance between the rights of biotechnology companies and
innocent fishermen. However, the uncertainty and insufficiency of these
remedies should also serve as a warning that the current state of property
law as applied to GM animals is not a workable system.
A. Pre-Escape Remedies
1. Seeking an Injunction of AAS Production Based on Gene-Flow
Concerns
The first possible course of action relies on the framework laid out in
Geertson.191 This is not the most effective option because the Geerston
Court, although opening the door for standing, also made it quite clear
that a full injunction against the use of GM organisms is not necessary to
avoid irreparable injury. The path, however, is well documented in
Geertson and it is an appealing option so far as it acts as a prophylactic
measure to avoid injury entirely.
In terms of the actual injunction, fishermen would need to
demonstrate how the unique nature of wild animals, as opposed to plants
in Geertson, makes a permanent or exceptionally broad injunction
necessary. This will be difficult. The fact that reversing an escape and
establishment of AAS might be impossible because it will result in the
actual destruction of existing wild populations certainly favors the
fishermen’s petition for injunction. AquaBounty and affiliated fish
farms, however, can also fall back on the fact that the containment
systems for AAS, at least as they currently exist, boast almost one
hundred percent containment success. So long as AAS farms can boast
reasonably high levels of containment, the courts will likely not favor a
full injunction against all AAS farms. Courts would also be reluctant to
enforce more nuanced injunctions, given that this would require
continual monitoring to ensure enforcement (e.g., requiring all new fish
farms to follow certain containment processes).
2. Using the Public Trust Doctrine to Stop or Limit AAS Sites at the
State Level
The public trust doctrine offers fishermen and non-GM stakeholders
a better means to block the construction of AAS sites. As discussed in
Part III, some state courts view their public trust doctrine as not only
granting state rights to control trust resources, but also imposing
191. See supra Part III.
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obligations on the state to ensure the protection of trust resources.192 If
non-GM fishermen make a compelling case about the unique danger
posed by AAS to state waters, the most traditionally protected of trust
resources, then courts can use the public trust doctrine to force more indepth environmental review at the state level. The insufficiency of the
federal system of review for AAS also bolsters the effort to seek
imposition of obligations. Fishermen will need to bring this suit against
the state (e.g., the Department of Marine Resources) as the trustee, and
not private fish farms.
3. State Legislation to Require Heightened Review and Insurance
A legislative remedy is a more optimal approach because it would
allow non-GM fishermen and stakeholders to rally public support and
also could avoid the influence of patent protection trend. In addition to
public pressure, states might respond to such requests for two reasons.
First, states that border fish farms, but do not have their own cashgenerating fish farms, would have an incentive to protect their wild
industries from bordering escapes. Second, the public trust doctrine
would serve as an equally useful leveraging tool in the legislative
context. The supremacy of federal patent law obviously poses a barrier
to any state legislation directly affecting the legal definition of
infringement. Effective legislation, therefore, would likely take the form
of heightened environmental review standards as well as strict insurance
liability. Insurance liability for AAS farms would not only serve as a
source to remedy the damages of any escape, but would also act as a
deterrent against the start-up of underfunded fish farms.
B. Post-Escape Remedies
Post-escape remedies, as mentioned above, are far less promising for
non-GM fishermen. As patent law currently exists, there are no defenses
for unintentional infringement or gene-flow. Non-GM fishermen, much
like non-GM farmers, will be held liable for infringement. As
demonstrated by Scruggs and Schmeiser, challenges to the validity and
enforcement of GM organism patents will not be considered valid
defenses. Therefore, challenging the damages, as was successfully done
in Schmeiser, is the best existing strategy for non-GM fishermen charged
with infringement. In essence, non-GM fishermen must demonstrate that
they do not benefit from their sale of AAS anymore than they would
192. See supra Part III.
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from the sale of wild Atlantic salmon. This is more difficult in the case
of AAS than GM plants because the AAS sold by fishermen will
invariably be larger and hence more valuable in net weight than the wild
fish they normally catch. Fishermen, however, can claim that the AAS is
worth far less than wild caught non-GM salmon because their consumer
base does not want to eat GM salmon. As a result, they may actually be
suffering losses from their capture and sale of AAS. This, of course, is
an insufficient remedy. Innocent fishermen should not be subject to the
expense of litigation for unintentional infringement caused by gene-flow
in the first place.
The uncomfortable relationship between GM plants and patent law
should not be extended to GM animals. The confusion created by GM
animals in the wildlife law context alone should serve as notification that
GM animals are not typical property. Courts and legislatures must
respond to these confusions not by further entrenching this
uncomfortable relationship, but by recognizing the realities of gene-flow
and offering non-GM fishermen some protection from the consequences
of patenting “anything under the sun” in our modern world of GM
animals.

